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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to award prejudgment and postjudgment 
interest where an interest rate is expressly specified in the subject contract? (Ex. 6; R. at 
10,1f 2; R. at 253; R. at 295; R. at 363:240.) A trial court's decision on "entitlement to 
prejudgment interest presents a question of law which we review for correctness." 
Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "As such, 
we accord no deference to the trial court's decision." Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT App. 5, 
Tf 23, 994 P.2d 817, 822. Similarly, "[w]e review the award of postjudgment interest, a 
question of law, under the correction of error standard." Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 876 
P.2d 421, 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow Ron Case Roofing to foreclose on 
the subject real property to collect its judgment where there is a statutory remedy of 
foreclosure? (R. at 296-97; R. at 363:241-42.) "We review questions of statutory 
interpretation for correctness, giving no deference to the district court's interpretation." 
Board of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, % 8, 94 P.3d 234, 236. 
3. Did the trial court err in awarding damages, in the form of an offset, for 
damage to a ceiling and roofing deficiencies where there was no evidence presented to 
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support such an award? (R. at 363:238.) A trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed 
"for correctness, according them no deference." Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 
13,^|16,73P.3d325,329. 
4. Did the trial court err in reducing the award for additional sheeting 
installation and materials from $1.59 per square foot to $1.25 per square foot where the 
subject contract specifies $1.59 per square foot, the experts of both parties testified that 
$1.59 per square foot was a reasonable cost for the installation and material, and there 
was insufficient evidence presented supporting a finding of $1.25 per square foot? (R. at 
363:237.) As noted in Issue 3, the standard of review for a trial court's legal conclusion 
is correctness with no deference given to the trial court. 
5. On appeal, is Ron Case Roofing entitled to its attorney fees for its success 
in appealing the above issues? This issue was not preserved at the trial court because it 
solely relates to the appellate proceedings. Because this is solely an issue on appeal, 
there is no standard of review. However, "[t]he general rule is that when a party who 
received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees 
reasonably incurred on appeal." Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). The trial court awarded Ron Case Roofing its reasonable attorney fees as the 
prevailing party. (R. at 363:240.) 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions which are determinative as to the issues 
raised. 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (2005): 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the loan or 
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of their contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate of 
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% 
per annum. 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any penalty or interest 
charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations 
made before May 14, 1981. 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (2005): 
(1) As used in this section, "federal postjudgment interest rate" means the interest rate 
established for the federal court system under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961, as amended. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a judgment rendered on a lawful contract 
shall conform to the contract and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which 
shall be specified in the judgment. 
(b) A judgment rendered on a deferred deposit loan subject to Title 7, Chapter 23, 
Check Cashing Registration Act, shall bear interest at the rate imposed under Subsection 
(3) on an amount not exceeding the sum of: 
(i) the total of the principal balance of the deferred deposit loan; 
(ii) interest at the rate imposed by the deferred deposit loan agreement for a period 
not exceeding 12 weeks as provided in Subsection 7-23-105(4); 
(iii) costs; 
(iv) attorney fees; and 
(v) other amounts allowed by law and ordered by the court. 
(3) (a) Except as otherwise provided by law, other civil and criminal judgments of the 
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district court and justice court shall bear interest at the federal postjudgment interest rate 
as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%. 
(b) The postjudgment interest rate in effect at the time of the judgment shall remain 
the interest rate for the duration of the judgment. 
(c) The interest on criminal judgments shall be calculated on the total amount of the 
judgment. 
(d) Interest paid on state revenue shall be deposited in accordance with Section 63A-8-
301. 
(e) Interest paid on revenue to a county or municipality shall be paid to the general 
fund of the county or municipality. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-15 (2005): 
The court shall cause the property to be sold in satisfaction of the liens and costs as in the 
case of foreclosure of mortgages, subject to the same right of redemption. If the proceeds 
of sale after the payment of costs shall not be sufficient to satisfy the whole amount of 
liens included in the decree, then such proceeds shall be paid in the order above 
designated, and pro rata to the persons claiming in each class where the sum realized is 
insufficient to pay the persons of such class in full. Any excess shall be paid to the owner. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (2005): 
(1) Judgments shall continue for eight years from the date of entry in a court unless 
previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance with 
law. 
(2) Prior to July 1, 1997, except as limited by Subsections (4) and (5), the entry of 
judgment by a district court creates a lien upon the real property of the judgment debtor, 
not exempt from execution, owned or acquired during the existence of the judgment, 
located in the county in which the judgment is entered. 
(3) An abstract of judgment issued by the court in which the judgment is entered may be 
filed in any court of this state and shall have the same force and effect as a judgment 
entered in that court. 
(4) Prior to July 1, 1997, and after May 15, 1998, a judgment entered in the small claims 
division of any court shall not qualify as a lien upon real property unless abstracted to the 
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civil division of the district court and recorded in accordance with Subsection (3). 
(5)(a) If any judgment is appealed, upon deposit, with the court where the notice of 
appeal is filed, of cash or other security in a form and amount considered sufficient by the 
court that rendered the judgment to secure the full amount of the judgment, together with 
ongoing interest and any other anticipated damages or costs, including attorneys fees and 
costs on appeal, the lien created by the judgment shall be terminated as provided in 
Subsection (5)(b). 
(b) Upon the deposit of sufficient security as provided in Subsection (5)(a), the court 
shall enter an order terminating the lien created by the judgment and granting the 
judgment creditor a perfected lien in the deposited security as of the date of the original 
judgment. 
(6)(a) A child support order or a sum certain judgment for past due support may be 
enforced: 
(i) within four years after the date the youngest child reaches majority; or 
(ii) eight years from the date of entry of the sum certain judgment entered by a 
tribunal. 
(b) The longer period of duration shall apply in every order. 
(c) A sum certain judgment may be renewed to extend the duration. 
(7)(a) After July 1, 2002, a judgment entered by a district court or a justice court in the 
state becomes a lien upon real property if: 
(i) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment containing the information 
identifying the judgment debtor as described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(4) is recorded 
in the office of the county recorder; or 
(ii) the judgment or an abstract of the judgment and a separate information statement 
of the judgment creditor as described in Subsection 78-22-1.5(5) is recorded in the 
office of the county recorder. 
(b) The judgment shall run from the date of entry by the district court or justice court. 
(c) The real property subject to the lien includes all the real property of the judgment 
debtor: 
(i) in the county in which the recording under Subsection (7)(a)(i) or (ii) occurs; and 
(ii) owned or acquired at any time by the judgment debtor during the time the 
judgment is effective. 
(d) State agencies are exempt from the recording requirement of Subsection (7)(a). 
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(8)(a) A judgment referred to in Subsection (7) shall be entered under the name of the 
judgment debtor in the judgment index in the office of the county recorder as required in 
Section 17-21-6. 
(b) A judgment containing a legal description shall also be abstracted in the appropriate 
tract index in the office of the county recorder. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE 
The dispute between Plaintiff/Appellant, Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, 
L.L.C. ("Ron Case Roofing"), and Defendants/Appellees, Clarence Gene Sturzenegger 
and Peggy Ann Sturzenegger ("Sturzenegger"), relates to work Ron Case Roofing 
performed on the Sturzenegger single-family dwelling located at approximately 1849 
East 5600 South in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and further described 
as LOT 1, LAKEWOOD # 6 SUB., Parcel No. 22-16-206-011-0000 ("Project" or 
"Property") and Sturzenegger's failure to pay for the work Ron Case Roofing performed. 
The trial court entered final judgment in favor of Ron Case Roofing and against 
Sturzenegger on October 13, 2005. From that entry of judgment, Ron Case Roofing now 
appeals. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT 
Ron Case Roofing commenced the action on October 17, 2003, against 
Sturzenegger and a trial was held. On October 13, 2005, the trial court entered final 
judgment in favor of Ron Case Roofing and against Sturzenegger as follows: 
Principal $10,264.00 
Costs $487.65 
Attorney Fees $10,000.00 
Total Judgment $20,751.65 
Accordingly, the trial court determined that Ron Case Roofing was the prevailing party. 
On October 20, 2005, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), Ron Case 
Roofing moved the trial court to amend the amount of attorney fees awarded in the final 
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judgment, which stayed the time for filing this appeal under Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(b). The trial court held a hearing to consider Ron Case Roofing's motion on 
January 9, 2006. The trial court denied the motion and allowed the final judgment to 
stand. 
This appeal is from the Final Judgment entered October 13, 2005. Ron Case 
Roofing filed its Notice of Appeal in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on January 25, 2006. On February 15, 2006, Ron Case Roofing filed its Docketing 
Statement with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Contract 
1. In or about November 2002, Stuzenegger solicited a proposal from Ron 
Case Roofing for roofing services for the Property. (R. at 240, f^ 6.) 
2. On or about November 19, 2002, Shain Case, a representative of Ron Case 
Roofing, met with Sturzenegger. (R. at 240, Tf 7.) 
3. During the meeting, Shain Case prepared "Proposal and Contract No. 
3R3074S" for work to be performed at the Property (the "Contract"), a copy of which 
was left with Sturzenegger for her review and execution. (Ex. 6; R. at 9-10; R. at 240, Tf 
9.) The Contract was admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit No. 6. (R. at 363:20.) 
4. The Contract is "fairly straightforward." (R. at 240, \ 10; R. 363:234.) 
5. The roofing services identified on the Contract included removal of the 
existing roofing membrane to the roof deck, installation of a new built-up tar and gravel 
roof system, installation of new aluminum gutters and downspouts, installation of new 
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high rise gravity vents, and installation of a new gravel stop (the "Work"). (Ex. 6; R. at 
9; R. at 240,1(11.) 
6. Pursuant to the Contract, Ron Case Roofing agreed to perform the Work for 
the Original Price of $12,450.00. (Ex. 6; R. at 9; R. at 253, H 2.) 
7. Pursuant to the Contract, Sturzenegger agreed to pay the amount of 
$12,450.00 for the Work. (Ex. 6; R. at 9; R. at 253, % 3.) 
8. In addition to the Work, the Contract provided for contingencies, including: 
a. If the existing substrate needed new sheeting, Sturzenegger agreed to 
pay $1.59 per square foot for the replacement of the same. (Ex. 6; R. at 9; R. at 
254,1J4B.) 
b. If there were problems requiring extra work, and Ron Case Roofing 
was unable to contact Sturzenegger, Sturzenegger agreed that Ron Case Roofing 
could proceed with the work, using its best judgment, and Sturzenegger agreed to 
pay for any such work so performed. (Ex. 6; R. at 10, f 13; R. at 254, *| 4C.) 
9. The contingencies, if encountered, would increase the Original Price. (R. at 
241,1(14.) 
10. Sturzenegger did not invite Ron Case Roofing to inspect the interior of the 
Property and did not inform Ron Case Roofing that her master bedroom had an exposed 
vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling. (R. at 241, ^ 16.) 
11. After having the Contract in her possession for approximately five months, 
on or about April 14, 2003, Sturzenegger signed the Contract. (Ex. 6; R. at 9; R. at 241, 
1117, 19.) 
B. The Sheeting 
12. On or about April 22, 2003, Ron Case Roofing mobilized at the Property 
and began its work under the Contract. (R. at 242, ^ 24.) 
13. Upon removal of the tar and gravel roofing systems, Ron Case Roofing 
observed the existing roof deck and its condition. (R. at 244, \ 44.) 
14. Ron Case Roofing determined that the existing roof deck was in 
unsatisfactory condition for installation of the new built-up tar and gravel roof system. 
(R. at 244, % 45.) 
15. The International Building Code, which Utah adopted, provides at section 
1510.2 that "Structural roof components shall be capable of supporting the roof-covering 
system and the material and equipment loads that will be encountered during installation 
of the system." (R. at 244, ^ 46.) 
16. At the time of this determination, Sturzenegger was not at the Property and 
could not be otherwise contacted because she was in Hawaii and had not left any contact 
information with Ron Case Roofing. (R. at 245, fflf 47, 49.) 
17. At the time of this determination, no one having information on 
Sturzenegger's whereabouts was at the Property. (R. at 245, If 48.) 
18. At no time while performing the Work did Ron Case Roofing have a 
telephone number where Sturzenegger could be reached or any other means of contacting 
her. (R. at 245, If 49.) 
19. Because Sturzenegger was unavailable, Shain Case, of Ron Case Roofing, 
took photographs of the roof, using a digital camera, so that Ron Case Roofing could 
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show Sturzenegger that the substrate was in poor condition and in need of new sheeting. 
(R. at 245,1(51.) 
20. Ron Case Roofing's foreman was present when the photographs of the roof 
at the Property were taken. (R. at 245, % 52.) 
21. Provision 13 of the Contract provides: 
If a problem should arise and workmen cannot contact Customer, 
Contractor will proceed with job utilizing Contractor's best judgment. In 
the event that additional costs are incurred by Contractor under these 
circumstances, Customer authorizes Contractor to proceed with the project 
and agrees to pay any increase in costs. 
(Ex. 6; R. at 10, If 13; R. at 245,1j 50.) 
22. Ron Case Roofing, using its best judgment, determined that the substrate 
needed new sheeting to support the new built-up tar and gravel roof system and the 
material and equipment loads that would be encountered during the installation of the 
system. (R. at 245, f 53.) 
23. Ron Case Roofing installed new 7/16" OSB sheeting over the existing roof 
deck, which provided a satisfactory roof deck surface for installation of the new built-up 
tar and gravel roof system. (R. at 246, % 54.) 
24. The terms of the Contract provide in pertinent part: "Sheeting will be 
inspected for damage and replaced if needed at $1.59 per square foot." (Ex. 6; R. at 9; R. 
at 246, K 55.) 
25. At trial, Dan Holland, the expert for Ron Case Roofing, testified that $1.59 
per square foot was a reasonable amount to be charged for the sheeting. (R. at 246, f 56.) 
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26. At trial, Kraig Clawson, the expert for Sturzenegger, testified that $1.59 per 
square foot was on the high end of a reasonable amount to be charged for the sheeting. 
(R. at 246, If 56; R. at 363:217-18, 228-29.) 
27. At trial, Mr. Clawson also testified that if one were to contract with a 
roofing contractor for replacement of the sheeting over an entire roof deck, the price 
would not typically be $1.59 per square foot, but he did not provide any further cost 
figures as to this issue. (R. at 363:218.) 
28. The installation of the sheeting increased the Original Price, as the Contract 
provides. (Ex. 6; R. at 9; R. at 247, fflj 59-60.) 
29. On or about Friday, April 25, 2003, Ron Case Roofing completed the work 
pursuant to the terms of the Contract. (R. at 247, Tj 61.) 
C The Master Bedroom Damage 
30. The master bedroom of the Property had an exposed vaulted, wood, tongue-
and-groove ceiling. (R. at 248, f 66.) 
31. As explained above, Sturzenegger did not inform Ron Case Roofing that 
she had an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling in her master bedroom. (R. at 
249, U 67.) 
32. Sturzenegger also did not invite Ron Case Roofing to inspect the interior of 
the Property. (R. at 249, ^ 68.) 
33. Provision 19 of the Contract provides in pertinent part: 
Unless Customer requests Contractor's employee to inspect the interior 
surfaces of the building before roofing is commenced by Contractor it will 
be assumed that the interior damages were caused prior to commencement 
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of roof work by Contractor and owner agrees to hold Contractor harmless 
for such damages. 
(Ex. 6; R. at 10, f 19; R. at 249, f 69.) 
34. When Ron Case Roofing personnel inspected the roof of the Property, they 
had no reason to know that there was an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling over 
the master bedroom. (R. at 249, % 70.) 
35. Most homes have insulation above the ceiling. The insulation is typically 
installed in the interior of the home in the void under the roof substrate and above the 
ceiling. With an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling, there is no such void. 
Consequently, there is typically a layer of rigid insulation installed on the exterior of the 
home over the top of the roofs substrate. (R. at 249, j^ 71.) 
36. The Property did not have a layer of insulation on the roof over the master 
bedroom. (R. at 249, f 72.) 
37. The nails used for installation of the new sheeting pierced the master 
bedroom ceiling. (R. at 250, Tf 73.) 
38. When Ron Case Roofing began installing a new roof vent, it cut through 
the master bedroom ceiling and discovered that the master bedroom had an exposed 
vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling. (R. at 250, f 74.) 
39. On or about April 25, 2003, Sturzenegger returned to the Property and saw 
the condition of the master bedroom ceiling. (R. at 250, ^ 75.) 
40. Sturzenegger contacted Shain Case regarding the condition of the master 
bedroom ceiling. (R. at 250, ^ 76.) 
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41. Provision 17 of the Contract states in pertinent part that if there is "[a]ny 
damage caused by Contractor for which Contractor may be liable . . . , Contractor shall be 
given first opportunity to repair said damage before other Contractors are retained by 
owner." (Ex. 6; R. at 10, U 17; R. at 250, f 77.) 
42. On or about June 13, 2003, Ron Case Roofing, through counsel and by 
letter, communicated to Sturzenegger's attorney, its readiness and willingness to repair 
the master bedroom ceiling pursuant to provision 17 of the Contract. (R. at 250, ^ 78.) 
The letter was admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit No. 12. (R. 363:35.) 
43. Ron Case Roofing suggested several options for repairing the master 
bedroom ceiling. (R. at 250, % 79.) 
44. Ron Case Roofing estimated that its cost to repair the master bedroom 
ceiling would be $ 1,500.00. (R. at 251, % 80.) 
45. Sturzenegger refused to allow Ron Case Roofing to make any repairs to the 
master bedroom ceiling. (R. at 251, ^ 81.) 
46. Sturzenegger also refused to allow Ron Case Roofing to perform any clean-
up work related to the master bedroom ceiling. (R. at 251, j^ 82.) 
47. On or about July 29, 2003, Sturzenegger contracted with Scorpion of Salt 
Lake ("Scorpion") to make repairs to the master bedroom ceiling in exchange for 
payment in the amount of $3,000.00. (R. at 251, ^ 83.) 
48. Provision 16 of the Contract provides that "[n]o cost of service, materials, 
or goods supplied by owner or owner's agent, Contractor, or employees shall be charged 
back against Contractor's invoice, unless such services, goods, or materials were 
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furnished to Contractor or its employees, pursuant to Purchase Order issued by 
Contractor." (Ex. 6; R. at 10, If 16; R. at 251, % 84.) 
49. Sturzenegger never requested a Purchase Order from Ron Case Roofing for 
use of Scorpion to repair the master bedroom ceiling, and a Purchase Order was never 
issued by Ron Case Roofing for such. (R. at 251, f 85.) 
50. On or about July 29, 2003, Scorpion of Salt Lake made the repairs to the 
master bedroom ceiling. (R. at 251, f^ 86.) 
51. At trial, Ron Case Roofing remained willing to deduct its estimated cost of 
$1,500.00 from the outstanding contract balance for the master bedroom ceiling repairs. 
(R. at 251, f 87.) 
D. The Mechanic's Lien 
52. On or about April 25, 2003, Shain Case provided to Sturzenegger a billing 
statement (the "Billing Statement"), which states a balance due of $16,578.00. (R. at 
248, ffif 62-63.) The Billing Statement was admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit No. 
10. (R. 363:30.) 
53. Sturzenegger has not paid to Ron Case Roofing any of the balance due of 
$16,578.00. (R. at 248, Tf 64.) 
54. Sturzenegger admitted in her Answer to Ron Case Roofing's Complaint 
that monies are owed to Ron Case Roofing for the Work. (R. at 20, f 22; R. at 248, f 65.) 
55. Because Ron Case Roofing was not paid in full for the Billing Statement 
and the work it had performed at the Property, it caused a Notice of Mechanic's Lien to 
be filed against the Property (the "Lien"). (R. at 12; R. at 252, f 93.) 
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56. The Lien was recorded on June 13, 2003. (R. at 12; R. at 252, % 94.) 
57. The Lien was mailed to Sturzenegger, by certified mail, at the Property on 
June 13, 2003. (R. at 253, % 95.) 
58. Sturzenegger received the certified mailing at the Property and on or about 
June 18, 2003. (R. at 253, ^  96.) 
E. Prejudgment and Postjudgement Interest 
59. Provision 2 of the Contract states in pertinent part that "[i]n the event 
payments are not timely made, a finance charge of 3% per month will be charged on the 
unpaid balance from the date of completion to the date of payment before and after 
judgment." (Ex. 6; R. at 10, f 2; R. at 9; R. at 253, f 97.) 
F. Attorney Fees and Costs 
60. Provision 2 of the Contract states in pertinent part that "Customer agrees to 
pay all cost of collection and attorney's fees after default and referral to attorney and 
further agrees to pay after judgment costs of collection." (Ex. 6; R. at 10, \ 2; R. at 253, 
1198.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court should reverse the trial court for at least four reasons. First, because a 
creditor is entitled to interest as a matter of law and the Contract between Ron Case 
Roofing and Sturzenegger specified a rate at which interest would accrue, the trial court 
erred in not awarding Ron Case Roofing prejudgment and postjudgment interest at the 
rate to which the parties agreed in the Contract. Statutory law, case law, and public 
policy support this award of interest at the rate specified in the Contract. 
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Second, the trial court erred in prohibiting Ron Case Roofing from foreclosing on 
the Lien to collect on its judgment against Sturzenegger. Foreclosure for mechanic's 
liens is a statutory creation and nondiscretionary, which the trial court improperly 
ignored. 
Third, there was no evidence presented at trial to support Sturzenegger's claim of 
damages from ceiling damage and roofing deficiencies. Sufficient evidence is required 
for the trial court's legal conclusion. Therefore, the trial court erred in awarding 
Sturzenegger damages in the form of an offset against Ron Case Roofing's award. 
Fourth, the trial court erred in changing the express provision of the contract 
related to replacement material and installation costs. There was no evidence presented 
at trial to support the trial court's legal conclusion and interference with the clear and 
unambiguous language of the contract to which the parties agreed. 
Finally, the trial court's award of attorney fees should be increased to account for 
Ron Case Roofing's additional success on appeal. Ron Case Roofing also is entitled to 
its attorney fees and costs on appeal because its action arises from the construction 
contract, which provides for an award of fees to the prevailing party. Therefore, this 
Court should reverse the trial court and enter judgment as to these matters in favor of Ron 
Case Roofing and against Sturzenegger. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD RON CASE 
ROOFING INTEREST AT THE RATE SPECIFIED IN THE CONTRACT 
BECAUSE IT IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
This Court should reverse the trial court and award Ron Case Roofing 
prejudgment and postjudgment interest at the rate specified in the contract because a 
creditor is entitled to interest as a matter of law and Ron Case Roofing and Sturzenegger 
agreed to a specific interest rate in the Contract. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
in "contract cases/' "interest on amounts found to be due injudicial proceedings is 
recovery to which the creditor is entitled as a matter of law." Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 
800, 809 (Utah 1979). The instant case is a "contract case" because the action included 
enforcement of a construction contract, and the trial court found that Ron Case Roofing is 
due monies on the Contract in the principal amount of $10,264.00. Thus, Ron Case 
Roofing is entitled to recover interest on that amount as a matter of law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated with approval that "'interest as the parties 
to a contract have agreed upon as part of their contract. . . is as much an integral part of 
the debt as the principal itself. . . ."' Farnworth v. Jensen, 217 P.2d 571, 575 (Utah 
1950) (quoting 30 Am. Jur. Trials § 2 (1950)). In support of the rate to which parties to a 
contract may agree, Utah law provides that "[t]he parties to a lawful contract may agree 
upon any rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in 
action that is the subject of their contract." Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(1) (2005). Here, 
the parties agreed in their valid and lawful Contract that "[i]n the event payments are not 
timely made, a finance charge of 3% per month will be charged on the unpaid balance 
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from the date of completion to the date of payment before and after judgment." (Ex. 6; 
R. at 10, f 2; R. at 253, f 97.) Therefore, interest should accrue at the rate of thirty-six 
percent per annum prejudgment and postjudgment from April 26, 2003, because, as the 
Contract reflects, that is what the parties agreed to. 
A. Prejudgment interest 
An award of prejudgment interest is proper when "the damage is complete, the 
loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a 
particular time." Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). However, ua court may only award prejudgment interest if damages are 
calculable within a mathematical certainty." Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT App. 5, % 24, 
994 P.2d 817, 823. Here, the damage is complete because Ron Case Roofing completed 
its work on the Property and Sturzenegger has not paid Ron Case Roofing for the work. 
The loss can be measured by facts and figures because it is a dollar amount. Finally, the 
loss is fixed as of a particular time because Sturzenegger was obligated and failed to pay 
Ron Case Roofing upon completion of its work on April 25, 2003. 
The award of prejudgment interest is also supported by public policy, because "an 
award of prejudgment interest simply serves to compensate a party for the depreciating 
value of the amount owed over time and, as a corollary, deters parties from intentionally 
withholding an amount that is liquidated and owing." Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah 
Div. of State Lands & Forestry. 921 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Utah 1996). From the start of this 
action, Sturzenegger admitted that an amount was owing to Ron Case Roofing. (R. at 20, 
% 22; R. at 248, ^  65.) Nevertheless, Sturzenegger intentionally withheld this admitted 
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amount as well as the amount the trial court found was owing. It was clearly contrary to 
public policy for the trial court to not award Ron Case Roofing prejudgment interest on 
the amounts owed under the Contract. Prejudgment interest is proper in this matter and 
should be awarded. 
B. Postjudgment interest 
Utah Code section 15-1-4 states in pertinent part that "a judgment rendered on a 
lawful contract shall conform to the contract and shall bear the interest agreed upon by 
the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment." Utah Code Ann. § 15-l-4(2)(a) 
(2005). As discussed above, the parties agreed to the interest rate of thirty-six percent per 
annum for postjudgment interest in their lawful contract. (R. at 10, % 2; R. at 253, f 97.) 
Accordingly, postjudgment interest should accrue at this rate as the statute provides. 
Sturzenegger will likely argue that she has paid the amount of the judgment to the 
trial court and, accordingly, postjudgment interest should not accrue beyond the date of 
the payment. This argument is without merit because Sturzenegger's "payment" is 
conditional and was not delivered to Ron Case Roofing.1 To accept this "payment," 
Sturzenegger requires that Ron Case Roofing satisfy the judgment and dismiss its appeal, 
together with relinquishment of the associated rights. If Sturzenegger truly wanted to 
avoid the accrual of postjudgment interest, she should have made an unconditional 
payment of the judgment amount. Without either of these actions and by conditioning 
*The letter of January 12, 2006, from Jason H. Robinson, attorney for Ron Case Roofing, 
to Tyler B. Ayres, attorney for Sturzenegger, describes the conditions on the monies 
deposited with the trial court. (R. at 344-45.) 
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payment to the trial court, Sturzenegger has not made satisfactory payment to Ron Case 
Roofing and postjudgment interest should continue to accrue. 
In conclusion, interest should accrue at the rate specified in the Contract because 
Ron Case Roofing is entitled to interest as a matter of law, the parties agreed to this rate 
of interest, and the award of prejudgment and postjudgment interest is supported by 
statutory law, case law, and public policy. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW RON CASE 
ROOFING TO FORECLOSE ON THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY TO 
COLLECT ITS JUDGMENT WHERE FORECLOSURE IS A 
STATUTORY RIGHT AND CREATION. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's limitation on foreclosure because Ron 
Case Roofing is statutorily entitled to foreclose on its mechanic's lien, and alternately, 
judgment liens, as statutory creations, cannot be limited in their enforceability. The Utah 
mechanic's lien statute provides that, without discretion, "[t]he court shall cause the 
property to be sold in satisfaction of the liens and costs as in the case of foreclosure of 
mortgages, subject to the same right of redemption." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-15 (2005) 
(emphasis added). Ron Case Roofing had a valid and enforceable mechanic's lien on the 
Property. The Lien was properly recorded on June 13, 2003. (R. at 252,194.) On June 
13, 2003, the Lien was mailed to Sturzenegger, by certified mail. (R. at 253,196.) The 
trial court noted that the Lien was proper. (R. at 363:127-28.) Accordingly, Ron Case 
Roofing is entitled to foreclose on the Lien pursuant to Utah Code section 38-1-15. 
Nevertheless, despite the nondiscretionary statutory language that directed the trial court 
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to cause the Property to be sold to satisfy the Lien, the trial court refused to do so. (R. at 
363:241-42.) 
Instead of allowing foreclosure of the Property to satisfy Ron Case Roofing's 
Lien, the trial court awarded Ron Case Roofing a judgment lien but prohibited Ron Case 
Roofing from executing on that lien against the Property. (R. at 296-97; R. at 363:241-
42.) For that reason, even if Ron Case Roofing cannot foreclose on its mechanic's lien, 
Ron Case Roofing should be allowed to execute on its judgment lien. The judgment lien 
statute provides that "a judgment entered by a district court or a justice court in the state 
becomes a lien upon real property" if the recording and filing requirements of the 
subsection are met. Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-l(7)(a) (2005). The Utah Supreme Court 
has further explained that "[a] judgment lien provides a judgment creditor with a means 
of satisfying a judgment from a judgment debtor's real property." Diversified Holdings, 
L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, f 40, 63 P.3d 686, 702. It "may be enforced by writ of 
execution, levy, and sale . . . ." Id Furthermore, it "is a creature of statute, and it is for 
the legislature to alter the terms of its creation and termination." IcL at f^ 47, 63 P.3d at 
705. In the present matter, the trial court ignored the statutory effect of a judgment lien 
and denied Ron Case Roofing's right to execute on its judgment. 
Sturzenegger will likely argue that foreclosure on the mechanic's lien or the 
judgment lien is not required because she made "payment" in the amount of the judgment 
to the trial court. Again, this argument is without merit because Sturzenegger's 
"payment" is conditional and was not delivered to Ron Case Roofing. (R. at 344-45.) 
Furthermore, an increase in the award to Ron Case Roofing by success on appeal 
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necessitates having foreclosure as a mechanism for obtaining relief. Sturzenegger's 
payment to the trial court will not satisfy the additional award, and there is no guarantee 
that Sturzenegger will voluntarily pay the additional amount. 
This Court should reverse the trial court and allow Ron Case Roofing to foreclose 
on its Lien on the Property pursuant to the Utah mechanic's lien statute. The Court 
should allow Ron Case Roofing to foreclose on the judgment lien the trial court awarded. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING STURZENEGGER 
DAMAGES IN THE FORM OF OFFSETS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE 
DID NOT SUPPORT THIS LEGAL CONCLUSION. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's award of offsets to Sturzenegger for 
ceiling damages and deficiencies in the new roof construction because there was no 
evidence presented as to the amount of damages sustained in support of the trial court's 
legal conclusion. The Utah Supreme Court has explained that to prove damages, a party 
must prove (1) "the fact of damages" and (2) "the amount of damages." Atkin Wright & 
Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985). In measuring 
the damages, the claimant has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the cost of the 
repairs. 25 C.J.S., Damages, § 144. There "must be evidence that rises above speculation 
and provides a reasonable . . . estimate of damages." Atkin Wright, 709 P.2d at 336. In 
Atkin Wright, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the jury's award of damages because the 
party claiming damages, while offering sufficient proof of the fact of damages, failed to 
offer sufficient proof of the amount of its damages. Id at 337. Similarly, in the case now 
before the Court, Sturzenegger offered insufficient evidence as to the amount of damages 
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she sustained from the damage to her master bedroom ceiling and defects in the 
construction of the new roof. 
A. Master Bedroom Ceiling Damage 
Pursuant to the Contract, Ron Case Roofing had a right to repair the damage to 
Sturzenegger's master bedroom ceiling, which it requested to do. (Ex. 6; R. at 10, ^  17; 
R. at 250, Tf 77; R. at 256, fflf 15-16.) Despite this request, Sturzenegger refused to allow 
Ron Case Roofing to repair the damage. (R. at 256, Tf 17; R. at 363:137.) Instead, 
Sturzenegger went off and did her own thing by hiring Scorpion to make the repairs. (R. 
at 256, Tf 18.) Sturzenegger would not even have allowed Ron Case Roofing to pay 
Scorpion directly. (R. at 363:209). Nevertheless, Shain Case of Ron Case Roofing 
testified that it would cost Ron Case Roofing about $1,500 to make the repairs to the 
master bedroom ceiling, and it gave Sturzenegger this amount as an offset against its 
claims. (R. at 363:34-35.) 
The only testimony related to the amount paid for the repair of the damage to the 
master bedroom ceiling was that Sturzenegger testified that she paid $3,000 to Scorpion. 
(R. at 363:138.) Kraig Clawson, Sturzenegger's expert witness, did not testify as to the 
amount of damage in dollars the master bedroom ceiling sustained or the reasonableness 
of the $3,000 payment for the repairs. (R. at 363:214-31.) He only testified that, in his 
opinion, it would not be workmanlike for Ron Case Roofing to puncture the master 
bedroom ceiling. (R. at 363:223-24.) It is most telling that the trial court even stated in 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that "[tjhere was no evidence presented at 
trial that the $3,000.00" Sturzenegger paid "was a reasonable amount." (R. at 256, ^ 19.) 
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Despite the lack of evidence to support its legal conclusion as an award of 
damages, the trial court improperly awarded Sturzenegger an offset of $2,400 using, as 
the trial court termed it, "Kentucky windage numbers"2 to reach its conclusion. (R. at 
256, % 20.) A payment alone should not be sufficient evidence or measure of the amount 
of damages. If it was, any amount of payment, no matter how grossly excessive, would 
entitle Sturzenegger to an offset. Sturzenegger simply failed to prove the reasonableness 
of her payment to Scorpion and the amount of damages related to the ceiling damage. 
The trial court's award of an offset to Sturzenegger for the master bedroom ceiling 
damage without evidence of the dollar value of that damage and its repair was incorrect. 
B. Roof Deficiencies 
The trial court found that there were certain deficiencies with the roof system Ron 
Case Roofing installed at the Property. (R. at 257, If 21.) Mr. Clawson testified that he 
was able to form an opinion, to a limited extent, as to the workmanship of Ron Case 
Roofing's work. (R. at 363:223.) Mr. Clawson took issue with the adequacy of certain 
areas of the asphalt and the damage to the master bedroom ceiling. (R. at 363:223-24.) 
The trial court also noted that from Mr. Clawson's report and photographs that additional 
deficiencies include slippage, lack of facing or flashing in certain areas, tar dripping, 
laminated fabric, flashing not sealed, improper base flashing nailing, and "some other 
"Kentucky windage" is slang that "sheds an image of indecision that is opportunistically 
resolved with licking one's forefinger and allowing the direction of a prevailing wind to 
settle an issue. In less political correct phraseology the odious approach allows for taking 
advantage of circumstance with little or no concern for principal or consequence." Joe 
Vella, Kentucky Windage, http.V/www.searchmalta.com/ezine/mouse/kentucy.shtml (last 
visited May 24, 2006). 
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things." (R. at 363:239.) While Ron Case Roofing does not challenge these findings, it 
does challenge the lack of evidence on which the trial court supported it award to 
Sturzenegger of an offset for these deficiencies. 
Mr. Clawson did not testify as to the dollar value of any of these deficiencies. (R. 
at 214-31.) Like the damage to the master bedroom ceiling, it is again telling that the 
trial court stated in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that "[t]here was no 
evidence presented at trial as to the dollar value of the deficiencies." (R. at 257, Tf 22.) 
However, once again, despite the lack of any evidence to support an award of damages 
for roof deficiencies, the trial court improperly awarded Sturzenegger an offset of $1,500. 
(R. at 257, Tf 23.) Again, the trial court used "Kentucky windage numbers" to reach its 
improper legal conclusion. (R. at 256, f 23.) The offset award to Sturzenegger for the 
roofing deficiencies was incorrect without any evidence of the amount of damages from 
those deficiencies. 
In sum, the trial court's legal conclusion of an award of speculative offsets despite 
there being no evidence as to the amount of Sturzenegger's damages for the repair of the 
bedroom ceiling and the roofing deficiencies was incorrect and should be reversed. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CHANGING AN EXPRESS PROVISION 
OF THE CONTRACT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR 
AN INTERFERENCE WITH THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS 
LANGUAGE TO WHICH THE PARTIES AGREED. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's legal conclusion of a different material 
cost than that to which the parties agreed and for which the express terms of the Contract 
provide because the Contract was integrated and unambiguous, making judicial 
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interference with the terms of the contract improper. "The purpose of a written contract 
is to put in definite and evidentiary form the terms upon which the minds of the parties to 
the contract have met." Erickson v. Bastian, 102 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1940). In 
evaluating the written contract, the court "must first ascertain whether the contract was 
integrated and second whether it was ambiguous." Bailey-Allen, 876 P.2d at 424. The 
Contract satisfies both of these requirements. First, the front side of the Contract 
provides that "[t]his document, including the provisions on the reverse hereof, when 
executed constitutes a binding and the total agreement." (Ex. 6; R. at 9.) Therefore, the 
Contract, which was executed by the parties, was integrated. Second, the trial court 
found that "the Contract is fairly straight forward." (R. at 240, J^ 10.) Consequently, the 
second requirement regarding ambiguity is satisfied. Ultimately, "where the parties have 
made an express contract, the court should not find a different one by 'implication' 
concerning the same subject matter if the evidence does not justify [such] an 
interference." Ted R. Brown & Assocs., Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 970 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Evidence that would 
support interference would include, for example, waiver or modification. See id. Thus, 
despite claims of unfairness by one party, courts "cannot 'alter the rights agreed to by the 
parties' by appeal to a more general sense of fairness." Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 
UT App 201, f 22, 71 P.3d 188, 194-95 (quoting Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc.. 844 P.2d 
331, 335 (Utah 1992)). Unfortunately, in the matter now before the Court, the trial court 
interfered with the express provisions of the Contract without evidential support for such 
an interference. 
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The evidence before the trial court showed that upon removal of the tar and gravel 
roofing systems, Ron Case Roofing observed the existing roof deck and its condition. (R. 
at 244, Tf 44.) Ron Case Roofing determined that the existing roof deck was in 
unsatisfactory condition for installation of the new built-up tar and gravel roof system. 
(R. at 244, % 45.) The International Building Code, which Utah has adopted, requires that 
"[structural roof components shall be capable of supporting the roof-covering system 
and the material and equipment loads that will be encountered during installation of the 
system." (R. at 244, ^ 46.) 
At the time of this determination, Sturzenegger was not at the Property and could 
not be otherwise contacted because she was in Hawaii and had not left any contact 
information with Ron Case Roofing. (R. at 245, ^  47, 49.) Furthermore, no one having 
information on Sturzenegger's whereabouts was at the Property. (R. at 245, ^ f 48.) At no 
time while performing the Work did Ron Case Roofing have a telephone number where 
Sturzenegger could be reached or any other means of contacting her. (R. at 245, ^  49.) 
Ron Case Roofing, using its best judgment, and pursuant to provision 13 of the 
Contract,3 determined that the substrate needed new sheeting to support the new built-up 
tar and gravel roof system and the material and equipment loads that would be 
encountered during the installation of the system. (R. at 245, ^  53.) Ron Case Roofing 
installed new 7/16" OSB sheeting over the existing roof deck, which provided a 
3uIf a problem should arise and workmen cannot contact Customer, Contractor 
will proceed with job utilizing Contractor's best judgment. In the event that 
additional costs are incurred by Contractor under these circumstances, Customer 
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satisfactory roof deck surface for installation of the new built-up tar and gravel roof 
system. (R. at 246, ^  54.) 
The terms of the Contract provide in pertinent part that "[s]heeting will be 
inspected for damage and replaced if needed at $1.59 per square foot." (Ex. 6; R. at 9; R. 
at 246, If 55.) At trial, Dan Holland, the expert for Ron Case Roofing, testified that $1.59 
per square foot was a reasonable amount to be charged for the sheeting. (R. at 246, f 56.) 
This was the only amount to which he testified. Mr. Holland also opined that the 
installation of new roof sheeting for the substrate was appropriate. (R. at 363:155.) 
Similarly, Kraig Clawson, the expert for Sturzenegger, testified that $1.59 per square foot 
was on the high end of a reasonable amount to be charged for the sheeting. (R. at 246, ^ 
56; R. at 363:217-18, 228-29.) Mr. Clawson also testified that if one were to contract 
with a roofing contractor for replacement of the sheeting over an entire roof deck, the 
price would not typically be $1.59 per square foot, but he did not provide any further cost 
figures as to this issue. (R. at 363:218.) Mr. Clawson testified that he did not have 
enough information to form an opinion as to whether the sheeting should have been 
replaced. (R. at 363:226-27.) The trial court even stated in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law that "there was no evidence presented as to a different amount that 
should have been charged for the sheeting, other than the $1.59 per square foot amount 
set forth in the Contract, for the sheeting.55 (R. at 246, ^ 57.) 
authorizes Contractor to proceed with the project and agrees to pay any increase in 
costs.55 (Ex. 6; R. at 10, f 13; R. at 245, % 50.) 
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Sturzenegger has never asserted facts going to waiver, modification, or any other 
basis for the trial court's interference with the clear and unambiguous terms of the 
Contract. Notwithstanding the express provisions of the Contract and the weight of the 
evidence, the trial court made the legal conclusion that Sturzenegger should be required 
to pay only $1.25 per square foot for the sheeting, instead of $1.59 per square foot as the 
Contract provides and to which the parties agreed. (R. at 255, Tf 8.) This finding 
obviously incorrect and should be reversed because the express contract was integrated 
and unambiguous and the agreement of the parties should not be disturbed without 
evidence supporting the trial court's interference. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE 
ADJUSTED DUE TO THE INCREASED SUCCESS RON CASE ROOFING 
OBTAINS ON APPEAL, AND RON CASE ROOFING IS ENTITLED TO 
ITS ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
With the increased success Ron Case Roofing obtains on appeal, this Court should 
proportionally adjust the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs because Ron Case 
Roofing ultimately prevails to a greater extent on its claims. Ron Case Roofing does not 
dispute that the trial court was entitled to determine an award of attorney fees and costs to 
Ron Case Roofing as the prevailing party. 
Ron Case Roofing submitted an affidavit of attorney fees in the amount of 
$25,599.00 on or about September 19, 2005. (R at 263.) Sturzenegger did not object to 
the affidavit. Nevertheless, the trial court ultimately awarded Ron Case Roofing only 
$10,000.00 in attorney fees. (R at 295.) In making the award, the trial court stated that it 
discounted the amount of awarded because "while plaintiff prevailed on the basic claim, 
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there were a number of aspects of plaintiff s claim and defendants' counterclaim that 
were not fully won by the plaintiff." (R at 295.) The trial court also discounted the 
award because "given the amount of the claim and the actual result obtained, the initial 
attorney's fees claimed appeared to be excessive." (R at 295.) Clearly, the issues now on 
appeal, including prejudgment and postjudgment interest, mechanic's lien foreclosure, 
damages offsets, and contract interpretation, must have factored into the trial court's 
determination of Ron Case Roofing's success and the actual result obtained. With these 
reasons for the award in mind, it is only proper for the trial court award of attorney fees 
to Ron Case Roofing to be increased to reflect the additional success Ron Case Roofing 
obtains on appeal. 
Furthermore, Ron Case Roofing explicitly requests its attorney fees for bringing 
this appeal because its action was brought to enforce the Contract. "A party seeking to 
recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth 
the legal basis for such an award." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The legal basis for an 
award of attorney fees to Ron Case Roofing arises from the Contract. Specifically, "a 
provision for payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by 
the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is brought to enforce the 
contract." Mgmt Servs. Corp. v. Dev. Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980). Also, 
"[t]he general rule is that when a party who received attorney fees below prevails on 
appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Brown v. 
Richards. 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Contract includes a provision for 
payment of attorney fees to the prevailing party. (Ex. 6; R. at 10, ^  2; R. at 253, % 98.) 
25 
The trial court found that Ron Case Roofing was the prevailing party below. (R. at 
363:240.) Accordingly, because Ron Case Roofing's action was to enforce the Contract, 
including the attorney fee provision for the prevailing party, Ron Case Roofing is entitled 
to its attorney fees on appeal as well as at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons contained herein, Ron Case Roofing respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court's legal conclusions with regard to the award of interest, lien 
foreclosure, the damages offsets, and interference with the contract. Additionally, Ron 
Case Roofing respectfully requests an award of its attorney fees and costs on appeal, in 
addition to an adjustment of the trial court's award of attorney fees to which Ron Case 
Roofing is entitled in relation to its additional success on appeal. 
DATED t h i s ^ 5 ^ a y of May, 2006. 
BABCOCK SCOTT & BABCOCK 
Jason H. Robinson 
Adam T. Mow 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RON CASE ROOFING & ASPHALT 
PAVING, L.L.C, a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PEGGY ANN STURZENEGGER a/k/a 
PEGGY ANN JOHNSON 
STURZENEGGER, an individual; 
CLARENCE GENE STURZENEGGER, 
an individual; and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
| Case No.: 030923024 
Honorable John Paul Kennedy 
On Tuesday, August 2, 2005, the above-captioned action came before the 
Honorable Judge John Paul Kennedy on a bench trial. Plaintiff Ron Case Roofing & 
Asphalt Paving, L.L.C. ("Ron Case Roofing") was represented by Jason H. Robinson 
of BABCOCK SCOTT & BABCOCK. Defendants Peggy Ann Sturzenegger a/k/a Peggy Ann 
Johnson Sturzenegger ("Peggy Sturzenegger") and Clarence Gene Sturzenegger 
("Gene Sturzenegger") (collectively the "Sturzeneggers") were represented by Tyler B. 
Ayres. Based upon the testimony and evidence presented at trial, and the pleadings, 
exhibits and documents on file in the above-referenced action, the Court makes the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
/. BACKGROUND 
1. Ron Case Roofing was, at all times relevant, properly licensed with the 
State of Utah, Department of Commerce, Division of Professional Licensing, as a 
roofing contractor. 
2. The Sturzeneggers were, at all times relevant, a married couple. 
3. The Sturzeneggers were, at all times relevant, owners of the subject 
detached single-family dwelling located at 1849 East 5600 South in Salt Lake City, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, and further described as LOT 1, LAKEWOOD # 6 SUB., 
Parcel No. 22-16-206-011-0000 (the "Property"). 
4. Peggy Sturzenegger is a high school graduate who attended Utah State 
University and who holds a Utah realtor's license. Peggy Sturzenegger is not a "babe in 
the woods". 
5. As part of obtaining her realtor's license, Peggy Sturzenegger attended 
classes where she learned about contracts. 
3192.03 2 
//. THE CONTRACT 
6. In or about November 2002, Peggy Stuzenegger solicited proposals from 
at least three roofing contractors, including Ron Case Roofing, for roofing services for 
the Property. 
7. On or about November 19, 2002, Shain Case, a representative of Ron 
Case Roofing, met with Peggy Sturzenegger and observed the existing tar and gravel 
roof system at the Property. 
8. Due to the inherent nature of a roof, Shain Case was able to observe only 
the surface of the roof. He was unable to observe what lie beneath the tar and gravel 
surface; such as the number of existing roof systems (previous roofs applied over the 
top of each other) and the condition of the existing substrate. (The substrate is the 
underlying wooden deck to which the tar and gravel roof system is applied and which 
supports the same). 
9. During the meeting, Shain Case prepared "Proposal and Contract No. 
3R3074S" for work to be performed at the Property (the "Contract"), a copy of which 
was left with Peggy Sturzenegger for her review and execution. (The Contract was 
admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit No. 6). 
10. The Court found that the Contract is fairly straight forward. 
11. The roofing services identified on the Contract included removal of the 
existing roofing membrane to the roof deck, installation of a new built-up tar and gravel 
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roof system, installation of new aluminum gutters and downspouts, installation of new 
high rise gravity vents, and installation of a new gravel stop (the "Work"). 
12. The estimated price for the Work was $12,450.00 (the "Original Price"). 
13. In addition to the Work, the Contract provided for contingencies, such as 
the existence of more than one roof system needing to be removed; the substrate 
needing new wood sheeting; and other conditions, which will be discussed below. 
14. The contingencies, if encountered, would increase the Original Price. 
15. Peggy Sturzenegger was aware that more than one roof system had been 
installed at the Property, but did not disclose this information to Ron Case Roofing. 
16. Peggy Sturzenegger did not invite Ron Case Roofing to inspect the 
interior of the Property and did not inform Ron Case Roofing that her master bedroom 
had an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling. 
17. Peggy Sturzenegger had the Contract in her possession from November 
19, 2003 through April 14, 2003. 
18. Peggy Sturzenegger reviewed the Contract. 
19. On or about April 14, 2003, Peggy Sturzenegger signed the Contract. 
20. Peggy Sturzenegger signed the Contract as "Agent for Owners or Owner". 
21. Provision 1 of the Contract defines the term "Owner" as the "Owner of the 
building, owner's architect, general contractor, owner's agent or others acting in behalf 
of owner." 
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22. On or about April 14, 2003, Peggy Sturzenegger paid Ron Case Roofing 
$6,000.00 as a deposit for the Work. 
23. Peggy Sturzenegger was aware that, pursuant to the Contract, Ron Case 
Roofing was to commence the Work within ten business days. 
///. THE WORK AND EXISTING CONDITIONS 
24. On Wednesday, April 22, 2003 (within ten business days), Ron Case 
Roofing traveled to the Property to commence the Work. 
25. Ron Case Roofing arrived at the Property with two trucks, a roofing kettle, 
at least one dumpster, and other roofing equipment. 
26. The trucks had Ron Case Roofing decals on them. 
27. Ron Case Roofing needed to place a dumpster in the driveway at the 
Property. 
28. Ron Case Roofing's foreman knocked on the door of the Property, 
introduced himself as a representative of Ron Case Roofing, and asked if there were 
any cars in the garage that needed to be moved before Ron Case Roofing placed the 
dumpster in the driveway (which would block access to the garage) and commenced 
the Work. 
29. Peggy Sturzenegger moved her car so that Ron Case Roofing could 
mobilize on the Property and commence the Work. 
30. Peggy Sturzenegger left the Property. 
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31. Peggy Sturzenegger did not tell Ron Case Roofing where she was going 
or when she would return. 
32. Ron Case Roofing personnel believed that Peggy Sturzenegger would be 
returning shortly, so they continued mobilizing and commenced the Work. 
33. Peggy Sturzenegger was aware that Ron Case Roofing was mobilizing on 
the Property to commence the Work. 
34. Ron Case Roofing subsequently learned that Peggy Sturzenegger was, in 
fact, leaving for Hawaii and would be away from the Property for three days. (This was 
learned after Peggy Sturzenegger's return from Hawaii). 
35. Peggy Sturzenegger did not inform Ron Case Roofing that she was 
leaving for Hawaii and did not instruct Ron Case Roofing to suspend performing the 
Work. 
36. Peggy Sturzenegger could have contacted Ron Case Roofing at anytime 
to inform them of her travel plans. 
37. The Contract sets forth Ron Case Roofing's office telephone number 
(upper left hand corner), office fax number (upper left hand corner), and Shain Case's 
personal cell phone number (upper right hand corner). 
38. Ron Case Roofing's office telephone number is also published in the Salt 
Lake City telephone directory. 
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39. Provision 21 of the Contract states in pertinent part that the "Contractor 
will proceed with the work once it is commenced on a continual basis...." 
40. It is important that roofing work be performed on a continual basis so as to 
avoid exposing the open roof to the elements, etc. 
41. There was rainfall around the time Ron Case Roofing performed the Work 
and the Extra Work. 
42. Upon removal of the first layer of tar and gravel roofing system, Ron Case 
Roofing discovered an additional, previous roof system layer covering the roof surface, 
which Ron Case Roofing had to remove. 
43. Provision 10 of the Contract provides: "If tear off is required, this bid price 
is based on one roof removal. If more than one roof exists, there will be an added 
charge of .45 cents per square foot for each additional roof to be removed." 
44. Upon removal of the tar and gravel roofing systems, Ron Case Roofing 
observed the existing roof deck and its condition. 
45. Ron Case Roofing determined that the existing roof deck was in 
unsatisfactory condition for installation of the new built-up tar and gravel roof system. 
46. The International Building Code, which has been adopted by Utah, 
provides at Section 1510.2 as follows: 
Structural and construction loads. Structural roof components shall be 
capable of supporting the roof-covering system and the material and 
equipment loads that will be encountered during installation of the system. 
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47. At the time of this determination, Peggy Stuzenegger was not at the 
Property and could not be otherwise contacted. 
48. At the time of this determination, no one having information on Peggy 
Sturzenegger's whereabouts was at the Property. 
49. At no time while performing the Work did Ron Case Roofing have a 
telephone number where Peggy Sturzenegger could be reached or any other means of 
contacting her. 
50. Provision 13 of the Contract provides as follows: 
If a problem should arise and workmen cannot contact Customer, 
Contractor will proceed with job utilizing Contractor's best judgment. In 
the event that additional costs are incurred by Contractor under these 
circumstances, Customer authorizes Contractor to proceed with the 
project and agrees to pay any increase in costs. 
51. Because Peggy Sturzenegger was unavailable, Shain Case, of Ron Case 
Roofing, took photographs of the roof, using a digital camera, so that Ron Case Roofing 
could show Peggy Sturzenegger that there was more than one roof system on the 
Property and that the substrate was in poor condition and in need of new sheeting. 
52. Ron Case Roofing's foreman was present when the photographs of the 
roof at the Property were taken. 
53. Ron Case Roofing, using its best judgment, determined that the substrate 
needed new sheeting to support the new built-up tar and gravel roof system and the 
3192 03 8 
material and equipment loads that would be encountered during the installation of the 
system. 
54. Ron Case Roofing installed new 7/16" OSB sheeting over the existing roof 
deck, which provided a satisfactory roof deck surface for installation of the new built-up 
tar and gravel roof system. 
55. The terms of the Contract provide in pertinent part: "Sheeting will be 
inspected for damage and replaced if needed at $1.59 per square foot." 
56. At trial, both experts testified that $1.59 was a reasonable amount to be 
charged for the sheeting. 
57. At trial, there was no evidence presented as to a different amount that 
should have been charged, other than the $1.59 amount set forth in the Contract, for 
the sheeting. 
58. In addition to removing the extra roof system and installing the new 
sheeting, Ron Case Roofing determined, using its best judgment, that the following 
extra work needed to be performed: 
A. Upon removal of the evaporative cooler from the roof, Ron Case 
Roofing discovered that the existing metal base upon which the evaporative 
cooler sits had rusted out and was inadequate to support the evaporative cooler. 
Ron Case Roofing constructed and installed a box to support the evaporative 
cooler. 
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B. During the Work, Ron Case Roofing discovered that three large 
pipe flashings had rusted out and were in need of replacement. Ron Case 
Roofing replaced these three large pipe flashings with new large pipe flashings. 
C. During the Work, Ron Case Roofing discovered that behind the 
roof fascia at a corner of the Property a portion of the wood had rotted away. 
Ron Case Roofing furnished new wood and performed carpentry work to repair 
this area of the roof. 
D. Peggy Sturzenegger requested three extra downspouts. Ron Case 
Roofing furnished these three extra downspouts. 
E. Ron Case Roofing was required to furnish an extra dumpster at the 
Property to contain and haul away the construction debris. 
59. The work described in paragraphs 42 through 58 is hereinafler sometimes 
referred to as the "Extra Work". 
60. The Extra Work performed by Ron Case Roofing increased the Original 
Price, as provided for by the Contract. 
61. On or about Friday, April 25, 2003, Ron Case Roofing completed the 
Work and the Extra Work, pursuant to the terms of the Contract. 
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IV. THE BILLING STATEMENT 
62. On or about April 25, 2003, Shain Case provided to Peggy Sturzenegger a 
billing statement (the "Billing Statement"). (The Billing Statement was admitted into 
evidence at trial as Exhibit No. 10). 
63. The Billing Statement states a balance due of $16,578.00 for the Work 
and Extra Work, as follows: 
! $12,450.00 
$1,800.00 
$7,314.00 
$285.00 
$267.00 
$85.00 
$177.00 
$200.00 
($,6000.00) 
$16,578.00 
Original Price for Work I 
Tear off and remove 4,000 square feet of extra roofing at .45 cents per 
square foot 
Install 4,600 square feet of sheeting at $1.59 per square foot 
Construct and install cooler box 
Install three extra large pipe flashings 
Perform extra carpentry work 
Furnish and install three extra downspouts at $59.00 each 
Furnish an extra dumpster 
Down payment j 
Total principal balance owed 
64. Peggy Sturzenegger has not paid to Ron Case Roofing any of the Invoice 
balance of $16,578.00. 
65. Peggy Sturzenegger admitted in her Answer to Ron Case Roofing's 
Complaint that some monies are owed to Ron Case Roofing for the Work. See 
Answer, Tf 22 ("Admits that an amount is due Ron Case Roofing.") 
V. THE MASTER BEDROOM DAMAGE 
66. The master bedroom of the Property had an exposed vaulted, wood, 
tongue-and-groove ceiling. 
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67. As explained above, Peggy Sturzenegger did not inform Ron Case 
Roofing that she had an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling in her master 
bedroom. 
68. She also did not invite Ron Case Roofing to inspect the interior of the 
Property. 
69. Provision 19 of the Contract provides in pertinent part: 
Unless Customer requests Contractor's employee to inspect the interior 
surfaces of the building before roofing is commenced by Contractor it will 
be assumed that the interior damages were caused prior to 
commencement of roof work by Contractor and owner agrees to hold 
Contractor harmless for such damages. 
70. When Ron Case Roofing personnel inspected the roof of the Property, 
they had no reason to know that there was an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove 
ceiling over the master bedroom. 
71. Most homes have insulation above the ceiling. The insulation is typically 
installed in the interior of the home in the void under the roof substrate and above the 
ceiling. With an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling, there is no such void. 
Consequently, there is typically a layer of rigid insulation installed on the exterior of the 
home over the top of the roofs substrate. 
72. The Property did not have a layer of insulation on the roof over the master 
bedroom. 
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73. The nails used for installation of the new sheeting pierced the master 
bedroom ceiling. 
74. When Ron Case Roofing began installing a new roof vent, it cut through 
the master bedroom ceiling and discovered that the master bedroom had an exposed 
vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling. 
75. On or about April 25, 2003, Peggy Sturzenegger returned to the Property 
and saw the condition of the master bedroom ceiling. 
76. Peggy Sturzenegger contacted Shain Case regarding the condition of the 
master bedroom ceiling. 
77. Provision 17 of the Contract states in pertinent part that if there is u[a]ny 
damage caused by Contractor for which Contractor may be liable . . . , Contractor shall 
be given first opportunity to repair said damage before other Contractors are retained 
by owner." 
78. On or about June 13, 2003, Ron Case Roofing, through counsel and by 
letter, communicated to the Sturzeneggers' attorney, its readiness and willingness to 
repair the master bedroom ceiling pursuant to provision 17 of the Contract. (The letter 
was admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit No. 12). 
79. Ron Case Roofing suggested several options for repairing the master 
bedroom ceiling. 
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80. Ron Case Roofing estimated that its cost to repair the master bedroom 
ceiling would be $1,500.00. 
81. Peggy Sturzenegger refused to allow Ron Case Roofing make any repairs 
to the master bedroom ceiling. 
82. Peggy Sturzenegger also refused to allow Ron Case Roofing to perform 
any clean-up work related to the master bedroom ceiling. 
83. On or about July 29, 2003, Peggy Sturzenegger contracted with Scorpion 
of Salt Lake ("Scorpion") to make repairs to the master bedroom ceiling in exchange 
for payment in the amount of $3,000.00. 
84. Provision 16 of the Contract provides that "[n]o cost of service, materials, 
or goods supplied by owner or owner's agent, Contractor, or employees shall be 
charged back against Contractor's invoice, unless such services, goods, or materials 
were furnished to Contractor or its employees, pursuant to Purchase Order issued by 
Contractor." 
85. Peggy Sturzenegger never requested a Purchase Order for use of 
Scorpion to repair the master bedroom ceiling, and a Purchase Order was never issued 
by Ron Case Roofing for such. 
86. On or about July 29, 2003, Scorpion of Salt Lake made the repairs to the 
master bedroom ceiling. 
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87. At trial, Ron Case Roofing remained willing to deduct its estimated cost of 
$1,500.00 from the outstanding contract balance for the master bedroom ceiling 
repairs. 
VI. THE ALLEGED LEAK 
88. In March of 2004, Peggy Sturzenegger contacted Ron Case Roofing 
regarding an alleged leak in the roof at the Property. 
89. On or about March 18, 2004, Ron Case Roofing inspected the roof at the 
Property for leakage by disbursing water on the roof. 
90. After Ron Case Roofing began disbursing water on the roof, Peggy 
Sturzenegger demanded that Ron Case Roofing stop its inspection, claiming she was 
concerned about her water bill. 
91. At trial, Ron Case Roofing's expert testified that the leak complained of by 
Peggy Sturzenegger was not a problem with the roof system installed by Ron Case 
Roofing. 
92. At trial, there was no evidence presented that the roof was still leaking. 
VII. THE MECHANIC'S LIEN 
93. Because Ron Case Roofing was not paid in full for the Work and Extra 
Work, it caused a Notice of Mechanic's Lien to be filed against the Property (the 
"Lien"), a copy of which is attached to Ron Case Roofing's Complaint as Exhibit "B". 
94. The Lien was recorded on June 13, 2003. 
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95. The Lien was mailed to the Sturzeneggers, by certified mail, at the 
Property on June 13, 2003. 
96. The Sturzeneggers received the certified mailing at the Property and on or 
about June 18, 2003, and Gene Sturzenegger signed for the same. 
VIII. INTEREST 
97. Provision 2 of the Contract states in pertinent part as follows: 
In the event payments are not timely made, a finance charge of 3% per 
month will be charged on the unpaid balance from the date of completion 
to the date of payment before and after judgment. 
IX. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
98. Provision 2 of the Contract states in pertinent part as follows: 
Customer agrees to pay all cost of collection and attorney's fees after 
default and referral to attorney and further agrees to pay after judgment 
costs of collection. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The foregoing Findings of Fact are incorporated herein by this reference. 
/. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: BREACH OF CONTRACT 
1. Ron Case Roofing was, at all times relevant, a licensed contractor. 
2. Pursuant to the Contract, Ron Case Roofing agreed to perform the Work 
for the Original Price of $12,450.00. 
3. Peggy Sturzenegger agreed to pay the amount of $12,450.00 for the 
Work. 
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4. In addition to the Work, the Contract provided for contingencies including, 
but not limited to, the following: 
A. If there was more than one roof system, Peggy Sturzenegger 
agreed to pay .45 cents per square foot for removal of the same. 
B. If the existing substrate needed new sheeting, Peggy Sturzenegger 
agreed to pay $1.59 per square foot for the replacement of the same. 
C. If there were problems requiring extra work, and Ron Case Roofing 
was unable to contact Peggy Sturzenegger, Peggy Sturzenegger agreed that 
Ron Case Roofing could proceed with the work, using its best judgment, and 
Peggy Sturzenegger agreed to pay for any such work so performed. 
5. At trial, Ron Case Roofing claimed it was owed the following amounts: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
$12,450.00 
$1,800.00 
$7,314.00 
$285.00 
$267.00 
$85.00 
$177.00 
$200.00 
($,6000.00) 
($1,500.00) 
$15,078.00 
Original Price for Work I 
Tear off and remove 4,000 square feet of extra roofing at .45 cents I 
per square foot 
Install 4,600 square feet of sheeting at $1.59 per square foot 
Construct and install cooler box 
Install three extra large pipe flashings 
Perform extra carpentry work 
Furnish and install three extra downspouts at $59.00 each 
Furnish an extra dumpster 
Down payment 
Ron Case Roofing's estimated cost to repair master bedroom ceiling 
Total principal balance owed 
6. The Court found that Ron Case Roofing performed the Work and the 
Extra Work set forth in the Billing Statement, as outlined above. 
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7. The Court found that Ron Case Roofing was entitled to the full amounts 
sought, and set forth above in paragraph 5, with the exception of items 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
8. As to item number 3, the Court found that Peggy Sturzenegger should be 
required to pay $1.25 per square foot for the sheeting, instead of $1.59 per square foot 
as set forth in the Contract. 
9. As to items 4-7, the Court found that Peggy Sturzennger should not be 
required to pay for the same. 
10. The Court found that Ron Case Roofing is entitled to the following 
principal amounts under its breach of contract cause of action: 
$12,450.00 
$1,800.00 
$5,750.00 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$200.00 
($,6000.00) 
($1,500.00) 
| $12,700.00 
Original Price for Work I 
Tear off and remove 4,000 square feet of extra roofing at .45 cents 
per square foot 
Install 4,600 square feet of sheeting at $1.59 per square foot 
Construct and install cooler box 
Install three extra large pipe flashings 
Perform extra carpentry work 
Furnish and install three extra downspouts at $59.00 each 
Furnish an extra dumpster 
Down payment 
Ron Case Roofing's estimated cost to repair master bedroom ceiling 
Total principal balance owed 
11. The Court found that failure to pay Ron Case Roofing the amounts 
referenced above in paragraph 10, when they became due and owing, constitutes a 
material breach of contract for which Ron Case Roofing is entitled to recover. 
12. The Court found that Ron Case Roofing is the prevailing party. 
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13. Pursuant to the Contract, Ron Case Roofing is entitled to an award of its 
costs of collection, including attorney fees. 
//. OFFSET 
14. Peggy Sturzenegger claimed offsets for the damage to her master 
bedroom ceiling and for alleged deficiencies in the roof system installed by Ron Case 
Roofing. 
A. Master Bedroom Ceiling. 
15. Ron Case Roofing had a right, pursuant to the Contract, to repair the 
damage to the master bedroom ceiling. 
16. Ron Case Roofing requested that it be allowed to repair the damage to 
the master bedroom ceiling. 
17. Peggy Sturzenegger refused to allow Ron Case Roofing to repair the 
damage to the master bedroom ceiling. 
18. The Court found that Peggy Sturzenegger went off and did her own thing. 
19. There was no evidence presented at trial that the $3,000.00 paid by 
Peggy Sturzenegger for repair of the master bedroom ceiling was a reasonable amount. 
20. The Court, using "Kentucky windage" numbers granted Peggy 
Sturzenegger an offset of $2,400.00 (which included the $1,500.00 that Ron Case 
Roofing voluntarily deducted from its claim as its estimated cost to repair the master 
bedroom ceiling). 
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B. Deficiencies with Roof System. 
21. The Court found that there were certain deficiencies with the roof system 
installed by Ron Case Roofing. 
22. There was no evidence presented at trial as to the dollar value of the 
deficiencies. 
23. The Court, using "Kentucky windage" numbers, granted Peggy 
Struzenegger an offset of $1,500.00. 
24. With the offsets, set forth above, the Court found that Ron Case Roofing 
is owed the principal amount of $10,264.00. 
///. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: UNJUST ENRICHMENT/ QUANTUM MERUIT 
(in the alternative to the first cause of action for breach of contract) 
25. Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, Peggy Sturzenegger requested that 
Ron Case Roofing perform the Work and the Extra Work. 
26. Ron Case Roofing performed the Work and the Extra Work. 
27. The Work and Extra Work benefited and improved the Property and 
conferred a benefit upon Peggy Sturzenegger and the Property. 
28. Ron Case Roofing performed the Work and the Extra Work with the 
expectation of being compensated for the reasonable value thereof and has not acted 
as a volunteer or intermeddler. 
29. To permit Peggy Sturzenegger and the Property to retain the benefit of 
the Work and Extra Work without compensating Ron Case Roofing for the same would 
3192.03 20 
result in unjust enrichment of Peggy Sturzenegger and the Property at the expense of 
Ron Case Roofing, which should not be allowed. 
30. The reasonable value of the Work and Extra Work, less the offsets set 
forth above, is $10,264.00. 
IV. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: FORECLOSURE OF LIEN 
31. Ron Case Roofing performed the Work and the Extra work at the request 
of Peggy Sturzenegger. 
32. The Court found that Peggy Sturzenegger was the "owner" of the 
Property. 
33. Ron Case Roofing's Complaint provides, at paragraph 5, as follows: 
Peggy Sturzenegger entered into a contract with Ron Case Roofing, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" (the "Contract"), to have 
certain roofing work, as set forth in the Contract, performed for an existing 
detached single-family dwelling situated upon real property owed by the 
Sturzeneqqers and located at approximately 1849 East 5600 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and more specifically described as follows: 
LOT 1, LAKEWOOD #6 SUB. 
Parcel No. 22-16-206-011-0000 
(Emphasis added). 
34. Peggy Sturzenegger, in her Answer to Ron Case Roofing's Complaint, 
admitted the allegations set forth in paragraph 5 of Ron Case Roofing's Complaint 
35. Gene Sturzenegger, in his Answer to Ron Case Roofing's Complaint, 
admitted the allegations set forth in paragraph 5 of Ron Case Roofing's Complaint. 
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36. At trial, Ron Case Roofing's counsel explained, based upon the Complaint 
and Answer filed in the above-captioned action, that the Sturzeneggers admitted that at 
all relevant times they were both owners of the Property. 
37. Ron Case Roofing's counsel also explained that the Sturzeneggers had 
not amended their respective Answers. 
38. The Sturzeneggers did not attempt to amend their respective Answers at 
trial. 
39. The Court took judicial notice of the Sturzeneggers' admission that they 
were, at all times relevant, both owners of the Property. 
40. Counsel for the Sturzeneggers stipulated that the Court could take judicial 
notice of the Sturzeneggers' admission that they were, at all times relevant, both 
owners of the Property. 
41. Based upon the Court's taking take judicial notice of the Sturzeneggers' 
admission that they were, at all times relevant, both owners of the Property, Ron Case 
Roofing's counsel forwent questioning the witnesses regarding ownership and authority 
to contract under Utah's mechanic's lien statute. 
42. Ron Case Roofing caused the Lien to be recorded on June 13, 2003, 
within ninety days of Ron Case Roofing's last date of performing work on the Property, 
in compliance with Utah Code Section 38-1-7. 
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43. Ron Case Roofing sent a copy of the Lien, by certified mail, to Mr. 
Sturzenegger on June 13, 2003, within thirty days of the date the Lien was filed, in 
compliance with Utah Code Section 38-1-7. 
44. Ron Case Roofing filed the instant foreclosure action on October 17, 
2003, within 180 days of its last work, in compliance with Utah Code 38-1-11. 
V. JUDGMENT LIEN 
45. The Court found that Ron Case Roofing is entitled to a judgment lien 
against the Property. 
46. The judgment lien shall relate back to and take effect as of April 22, 2003, 
and shall be superior to and have priority over, as a matter of time and right, any and all 
encumbrances recorded against the Property subsequent thereto. 
47. The judgment lien shall attach to any and all interest held in and to the 
Property by Peggy Sturzenegger and/or Gene Sturzenegger. 
48. Ron Case Roofing shall not be allowed to execute on its judgment lien 
against the Property. 
49. Ron Case Roofing may, however, execute against any other property and 
may use all other legal means of and methods for collecting its Judgment. 
50. Ron Case Roofing will be allowed to execute on its judgment lien against 
the Property in the event the Property is ever sold or otherwise transferred. 
3192.03 23 
DATED this tf day of 
3192 03 24 
NOTICE TO PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL 
You are hereby notified that pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(f)(2), any 
objections to these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law shall be filed within five (5) 
days of service hereof, together with any additional time provided for by Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 6(e). Upon the earlier of being served with an objection to the proposed 
order or expiration of the time to object, counsel for Plaintiff will file these Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law with the Court. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
p 7 ^ 
hereby certify that on this 4 ^ h day of August, 2005, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served by the method indicated below, to the following: 
Tyler B. Ayres t^tiTs. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
3267 East 3300 South, #126 n Hand Delivered 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
3192 03 25 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RON CASE ROOFING & ASPHALT PAVING, : FINAL .JUDGMENT 
L.L.C, a Utah limited liability 
company, : CASE NO. 030923024 
Plaintiff, 
vs. FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
PEGGY ANN STURZENEGGER, aka : 
PEGGY ANN JOHNSON STURZENEGGER, an QQJ 4 9 «fin,-
individual; CLARENCE GENE : '* *""') 
STURZENEGGER, an individual; and SALT LAKE coytfp? 
JOHN DOES 1-10, : ** IJT <— 
JUDGMENTS , . 
Deputy Clerk 
Defendants . ; E N T E R E D IN R E G I S T R Y 
OF 
" prrE. 
On Tuesday, August 2, 2005, the above-captioned action came before 
the Honorable John Paul Kennedy on a bench trial. Plaintiff Ron Case 
Roofing & Asphalt Paving, L.L.C. ("Ron Case Roofing7') , was represented 
by Jason H. Robinson of Babcock, Scott & Babcock. Defendants Peggy Ann 
Sturzenegger, aka Peggy Ann Johnson Sturzenegger ("Peggy Sturzenegger") 
and Clarence Gene Sturzenegger ("Gene Sturzenegger") (collectively the 
"Sturzeneggers") were represented by Tyler B. Ayres. 
The Court, having reviewed all pleadings and Memoranda on file in 
the above-captioned action and the authorities cited therein, having 
taken evidence, having considered the arguments of counsel, and having 
made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and being fully advised in 
the premises, hereby orders, adjudges and decrees, as follows: 
RON CASE ROOFING 
V. STURZENEGGER PAGE 2 FINAL JUDGMENT 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
The Court has received and carefully reviewed plaintiff's claim for 
attorney's fees. Based upon the amount of time devoted and the 
determination of the Court as to a reasonable hourly rate, the Court has 
awarded $10,000. The Court discounted the amount awarded for the 
following reasons: first, while plaintiff prevailed on the basic claim, 
there were a number of aspects of plaintiff's claim and defendants' 
Counterclaim that were not fully won by the plaintiff; second, given the 
amount of the claim and the actual result obtained, the initial 
attorney's fees claimed appeared to be excessive; and third, some of the 
time claimed (e.g., for trial preparation and related matters) also 
appeared to be excessive. 
JUDGMENT 
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Ron Case Roofing and against 
defendant Peggy Sturzenegger, as follows: 
Principal $10,264.00 
Costs 487.65 
Attorney's fees 10,000.00 
Total Judgment $20,751.65 
IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 15-1-4(3), that 
interest shall accrue at the rate of 4.82% per annum from the date this 
Judgment is entered until this Judgment is paid in full. 
RON CASE ROOFING 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that this judgment shall be augmented in the 
amount of reasonable costs and attorney fees expended in collecting said 
Judgment, as shall be established by Affidavit. 
JUDGMENT LIEN 
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED
 r that this Judgment shall be a Judgment 
lien on and against that certain real property located at approximately 
1849 East 5600 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and more specifically 
described as follows: 
LOT 1, LAKEWOOD #6 SUB. 
Parcel No. 22-16-206-011-0000 
(the ^ Property") . The Judgment lien shall relate back to and take effect 
as of April 22, 2003, and shall be superior to and have priority over, 
as a matter of time and right, any and all encumbrances recorded against 
the Property subsequent thereto. The Judgment lien shall attach to any 
and all interest held in and to the Property by Peggy Sturzenegger and/or 
Gene Sturzenegger. 
Ron Case Roofing shall not be allowed to execute on its Judgment 
lien against the Property unless and until such time as the Property is 
sold or otherwise transferred. In the meantime, however, Ron Case 
Roofing may execute on and against any other real and personal property 
RON CASE ROOFING 
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and may use all other legal means of and methods for collecting its 
Judgment. 
Dated this / ^ ^ day of October, 2005 
RON CASE ROOFING 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Final Judgment, to the following, this. _day of October, 
2005: 
Robert F. Babcock 
Jason H. Robinson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
505 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Tyler B. Ayres 
Attorney for Defendants 
3267 East 3300 South, Suite 126 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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ROOFING & 
ASPHALT PAVING L.L.C. 
P.O. BOX 70161 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84170 
(801)973-7663 
(801)886-2272 FAX 
PROPOSAL AND CONTRACT NO. 3^^Q2Xs 
THIS DOCUMENT, INCLUDING THE PROVISIONS 
ON THE REVERSE HEREOF, WHEN EXECUTED 
CONSTITUTES A BINDING AND THE TOTAL AGREEMENT. 
PLEASE READ BEFORE SIGNING. 
RRED BY <?jtf/f/?ncF: SLc- PROPOSAL 
IO. HOME PHONE NO. WORK PHONE NO. 
™*////?{o z 
REW7 
> ) 
CREV\( ASSIGNED 
W CONSTRUCTION O:// , HOME/ 
'OFB^IOYER: yy ADDRE; 
HO E ADDRESS PARTIAL 
PITCH FLAT 0/Vi -1/12 - 2/12 - 3/12 - 31/a/12 
SS: 
mm 
AME AND ADDRESS: ^ , . WORK ORDERED BY; 
:R OR AGENT TO CONTACT: HOME PHONE: WORK PHONE: 
REFERENCE^: v ADDRESS: . 
fj+m ft <& &**• fa' ^<£« &< d/2y 
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmm 
ASK ABOUT OUR 
EXTENDED WARRANTY 
PLAN 
THIS CONTRACT 
SUBJECT TO FINAL 
APPROVAL OF COMPANY 
^mmm^tmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm 
we existing rooting membrane to sheeting as indicated above and hauled away. Sheeting will be inspected 
amage and replaced if needed at % Z~f per square foot per !4 inch thick. Install new built up and gravel 
ig, including new gravel stop on edge, as indicated above. If primary structure is in good condition, new roof, 
properly maintained, should have a life-expectancy of 20 years. Our warranty is for two years on 
nanship. No other warranties are expressed or implied. One-half of the contract price is payable as down 
ient before the work is scheduled. The balance of the contract price is payable immediately upon completion, 
irf5onditions:'2^z^47 jz^7r7t^— ' /Pi^T** ,/\,a)fc£U. JU,J rt$tfb'± / £ * /Cv v / 7*a/~ / 
V^fe7 "7^ 
st be accepted within 30 days \ 
A&s?J- £ry)0.„, 
^ ^ ^ 
1 uwner means uwner or ounaing owners arcnueci general contractor owners ageni or otners acting in Denair or owner 
2 Terms are payment of 1/2 down and balance in full immediately upon completion of the work In the evenl payments are not timely ma 
finance .rnarge of 3% per month will be charged on the unpaid balance from the date of completion to the date of payment before and after i 
ment>% Customer agrees to pay all cost of collection and attorney's fees after default and referral to attorney and further agrees to pay after I 
ment cost of collection ' 
3 Tender of payment with checks or other negotiable instruments bearing words purporting to release all liens and/or fully satisfying the out* 
ing contract balance, when the amount shown on such instrument is less than the full amount of the contract balance, shall be nuB and voii 
shall constitute a breach of this agreement Contractor shall be entitled to present such instruments for payment without regard to such w< 
or legend and shall be entitled to pursue the balance of its claim or otherwise 
4 In the event the Customer sells, mortgages, or otherwise tiansfers or encumbers said premises, total amount of contract herein provided 
become immediately due and payable as to any and all amounts then unpaid, without necessity of any notice by then owner and holder of cor 
By the terms of this agreement customer hereby irrevocably assigns the amount due to contractor and directs any escrow agent or purcha 
honor this agreement 
5 In the event the premises herein above described shall be destroyed or damaged by fire or other cause prior to the payment in full < 
contract herein provided for, and the Customer shall become entitled to receive insurance by virtue thereof, Contractor shall subrogate to the 
to the customer for the balance then due on said contract, the insurance proceeds from any insurance companies liable to make such pay 
6 Customer waives all benefit of homestead and other exemption now or hereafter in force, together with the benefit of all statutes that m 
conflict with this agreement 
7 Customer realizes heavy equipment must be used to complete work and gives Contractor permission when necessary, to park or drive e 
grass concrete blacktop etc , at Customer's own risk and will not hold Contractor liable for damages 
8 Contractor will not be liable for damages to any part of the interior of the building or its contents which may arise from leaks of any t 
either before during or after roof has been applied 
9 This contract does not include repairs to gutters, downspouts pipes, metal flashings, or modifications by verbal agreements unless exp 
stipulated in the specifications 
10 If tear off is required, this bid price is based on one roof removal If more than one roof exists there will be an added charge of 45 
per square foot for each additional roof to be removed 
11 Warranty All roof repairs with set bid price guaranteed for a period of 90 days unless special one year guarantee is issued All guars 
begin on completion date Contractor agrees to repair any defect from faulty workmanship for the period of guarantee at no charge to pr< 
owner Non-Payment of the contract balance for more than 30 days after completion or substantial completion voids all warranties express 
implied AH time and materials repairs have no warranties expressed or implied 
12 All work will be done according to our best practices, to our specifications, and may vary as much as 45% of specification 
13 If a problem should arise and workmen cannot contact Customer Contractor will proceed with job utilizing Contractor's best judgemer 
the event that additional costs are incurred by Contractor under these circumstances. Customer authorizes Cor tractor to proceed with the p 
and agrees to pay any increase in costs 
14 Starting dates are estimated and are subject to availability of supplies, weather, and Contractor's workload 
15 Customer or agent shall not withhold payment to Contractor for alleged claim against Contractor or its employees All such claims sh 
submitted to Contractor's liability insurance carrier for resolution 
16 No cost of services, materials , or goods supplied by owner or his agent, Contractor, or employees shall be charged back against Contra 
invoice, unless such services, goods, or materials were furnished to Contractor or its employees, pursuant to Purchase Order issued by Co 
tor 
17 Any damage caused by Contractor for which Contractor may be liable and which requires repair services or materials customarily provtc 
Contractor, Contractor shall be given first opportunity to repair said damage before other Contractors are retained by owner 
18 Payment for this agreement will be made in full when due and all payments shall reflect Contractor as payee Payments made to any 
payee snail be at risk of Customer and may void any warranty if for any reason, Contractor does not receive full payment for the job A 
repairs or maintenance during warranty period or warranted roofs must be done by Contractor to maintain Contractor's warranty 
19 Unless Customer requests Contractor's employee to inspect the interio. surfaces of the building before roofing work is commenced by 
tractor it will be assumed that interior damages were caused prior to commencement of roof work by Contractor and owner agrees to hold Cc 
tor harmless from such damages 
20 In the event Customer defaults in payment of the contract price Customer assigns all rents and profits from the premises upon whu 
work was performed until Contractor is paid in full 
21 Contractor will proceed with the work once it is commenced on a continual basis, subject, however, to unavoidable delays due to inci 
weather, strikes, availability of materials specified by owner or agent and conditions commonly referred as acts of God 
22 Oral request for change shall not be binding on Contractor unless reduced to writing by signed Change Order 
23 Owner agrees to obtain and pay for all permits, licenses, fees and other cost required for the performance of this Contract 
24 Owner represents that the roof surface to be worked on by Contractor shall be free from impediments which may interfere with Contra 
performance of this Contract Any obstruction such as air conditioners, ducts, vents, pipes, conduits, wires, heating coils, heaters and oth jects which obstruct Contractor's performance shall be the sole responsibility of owner and Contractor shall be relieved of all claims for d 
or loss to such objects or arising as a result of necessity to remove or install such objects or the necessity to work around such obstrucl 
25 Any agreement to arbitrate disputes between Contractor and any other party shall be at the expense of the party seeking arbitration 
party requesting arbitration shall arrange for an arbitration hearing to be held within thirty (30) days from demand for final payment In the 
that the arbitration hearing is not held within thirty (30) days heretofore referred to, Contractor shall be relieved of any and all obligations t 
trate and may elect to initiate legal action to secure payment of such claims 
26 Owner shall not use Contractor's equipment to gain access to or descend from any roof or building or any other portion of the realty 
use is strictly prohibited by Contractor Any use of Contractor's equipment of any kina shall be at owner's ru»k and owner waives all habi 
injury, loss, or damage which may occur as a result of any such vise 
27 The parties agree that the prevailing party in any lawsuil arising from or as a result of this agreement, whether the action is based 
contractual provisions or on any other theory of liability, shall be entitled to an award of attorney's fees costs including witness fees , profe< 
experts fees and such other cost to prosecute or defend any action described above 
28 Customer grants permission for Contractor to put a sign on property until work is completed 
29 This proposal is based on roof deck being in ready condition and requiring no additional^  preparation pripr^  to roof application (i^ e s^n 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Mp day of May, 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served by the method indicated below, to the following: 
Tyler B. Ayres p^U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
3267 East 3300 South PMB 126 • Hand Delivered 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 • Overnight Mail 
• Facsimile 
